The Mask of Neo-Ottomanism and European Myopia
Every time Turkiye and its foreign policy are discussed in Europe, an exotic, appealing, and functional expression often appears in headlines: “neo-Ottomanism.” The term evokes a supposed ideology of restoring the Ottoman Empire recently attributed to the government of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, especially to describe his aggressive strategy in areas of the former empire, as well as an interpretive key for understanding the internal narrative and his consecration as a “sultan.” This rhetorical misunderstanding is based both on a limited and stereotypical knowledge of Turkiye, which is still considered by Western media as a threat, the “other of Europe” (as Professor Cengiz Aktar defined it), and on the difficulty in interpreting Turkish political communication, which simplifies the complexity of the current historical moment.
Ottomanism vs. Neo-Ottomanism: The Historical Contradiction
Regarding the origins of the term “neo-Ottomanism,” there is no unified or shared definition: the concept is still a subject of debate, and various theories have been proposed about it. Consequently, its meaning remains highly ambiguous. However, it must be assumed that the definition of “neo-Ottomanism” applied to contemporary Turkey contains both a semantic and political contradiction. If the term refers to a new form of Turkish expansionism, it stands in stark contrast to the original meaning of Ottomanism (Osmanlılık), which developed in the late Ottoman Empire. Ottomanism, particularly during the Tanzimat era in the 19th century (the phase of reforms aimed at modernizing the state), was an inclusive and civic project aimed at creating a shared Ottoman citizenship, beyond ethnic or religious affiliations. It was a response to the growing pressures of internal nationalisms and sought to preserve the empire’s integrity through a common identity under the symbolic authority of the sultan-caliph. Thus, Ottomanism was an imperial, pluralistic, and anti-nationalist ideology, founded on a supra-ethnic and supra-confessional vision. The historical Ottomanism, therefore, was a defensive project, not an expansionist one: a pragmatic attempt to keep together a declining empire. In the Ottoman Empire, for centuries, ethnic or social origin was irrelevant; through remarkable social mobility, even converted Christians could reach high positions due to their personal abilities. However, with the spread of European nationalist ideas after the French Revolution, many ethnic groups began to demand autonomy or independence, supported by European powers interested in weakening the empire. In this context, the Ottoman elite promoted reforms inspired by the principles of legal equality, secularism, and constitutional citizenship. Therefore, attributing a continuity between the so-called “neo-Ottomanism” and the Ottoman ideology means ignoring the history of the late Ottoman Empire. While the latter sought to manage and include pluralities, the modern Turkish Republic was instead built on a homogenizing statism, hostile to regionalism and minorities, which were considered a threat to its very survival. Some scholars, such as Bahadır Gonül and Marwan Kabalan, argue that neo-Ottomanism is primarily an ideological construct developed from the outside, with alarmist intentions. In fact, Bahadır Gönül, in his article Neo-Ottomanism in Turkish Politics, published in Stratejik Ortak, refers to Professor Kemal Karpat’s definition, according to which the idea of a renewed Ottoman vision began to emerge in the 1970s. In particular, Karpat referred to how Greece interpreted the Turkish intervention in Cyprus in 1974 as a sign of neo-imperial ambitions by Ankara. However, this interpretation is not universally accepted and is often considered the result of Greek schizophrenia. While it is widely agreed that the term “neo-Ottomanism” was coined in 1985 by David Barchard, he defined it as a “consciousness of the Ottoman imperial past,” which is “a more powerful force in Turkey than Islam.” This view is closely connected to the in-depth analysis by Professor M. Hakan Yavuz, who, in his work Social and Intellectual Origins of Neo-Ottomanism: Searching for a Post-National Vision, explores the ideological and intellectual roots of neo-Ottomanism.
From Turgut Özal to Erdoğan: The Metamorphosis of Neo-Ottomanism in Foreign Policy
According to Professor M. Hakan Yavuz, neo-Ottomanism should not be seen as a desire to restore an imperial past, but rather as a post-national reaction to the identity crisis promoted by Kemalism. It is an attempt to elaborate a new cultural and political narrative inspired by the complexity and historical richness of the Ottoman Empire. Yavuz argues that to truly understand the meaning of neo-Ottomanism, one must observe how the ideal and memory of the Ottoman Empire continue to exert a powerful influence on Turkey’s republican state path. Despite the Kemalist project’s efforts to erase any trace of the imperial legacy, the shadow of the Ottoman Empire has continued to manifest itself in the political and social life of the country. The more the Republic secularized and sought integration with the West, the more the need to recover a deep and authentic identity became apparent. At this point, the Ottoman legacy became a source of symbols, historical experiences, and cultural references through which to reinterpret the present and reconstruct Turkish identity. With Turkey’s rise as an emerging power and growing national confidence, references to the Ottoman world have become increasingly prevalent in the country’s cultural, political, and social discourses. According to Yavuz, nostalgia for the Empire should not be understood as a superficial longing for the past, but as an interpretative tool capable of explaining the nuances of the present. Yavuz also observes that many Turkish citizens do not fully identify with the modern and rigid idea of the nation-state, but rather feel part of a broader, multicultural project. This vision is fueled by a renewed awareness of Ottoman greatness and a shared sense of the need to preserve its heritage. What the professor defines as neo-Ottomanism represents a vision oriented towards the transformation of Turkish national identity, through the recovery of historical, cultural, and religious ties with the former Ottoman provinces. As a result, a modern Turkish identity emerges, inspired by the Ottoman legacy, which tends to project itself beyond the geographical boundaries of Anatolia. This interpretation by the professor fits coherently with Erdoğan’s vision, expressed through the concept of Türkiye Yüzyılı (The Century of Turkey), aimed at achieving a profound cultural transformation of Turkish society.
Yavuz further argues that while history and memory are closely related concepts, memory has a more subjective and communal character: it is a process that develops in the present to interpret the past and guide the future. In this perspective, neo-Ottomanism does not seek to literally restore the Empire but to reinterpret it according to current needs. This process is manifested through various cultural tools such as cinema, media, architecture, music, and literature, which help create narratives capable of symbolically “reclaiming” a forgotten heritage. Already in the 1990s, when he was mayor of Istanbul, Erdoğan initiated a series of successful cultural programs aimed at bringing Ottoman tradition and Islam back into the public sphere. In this sense, neo-Ottomanism proposes an alternative and inclusive identity model, capable of overcoming the rigid nation-state structure of Kemalism. The concept of neo-Ottomanism began to take concrete shape during Turgut Özal’s era, considered one of the most beloved presidents in the history of the Turkish Republic. Özal, who served as prime minister twice and president until 1993, promoted a new vision of Turkish foreign policy, seeking to re-establish a connection with the Ottoman legacy by emphasizing the common historical, cultural, and religious roots with former imperial provinces. With the Kurdish issue increasingly at the center of the national agenda, Özal recognized the limits of the Kemalist model based on linguistic and cultural homogeneity and the removal of Islam from the public sphere in the name of secularism. He proposed an alternative approach that integrated Islamic elements, cultural pluralism, and openness to Europe. His vision recognized and embraced the country’s identity diversity—Özal himself was of Kurdish origin. His goal was to overcome the rigid structure of Kemalist identity and promote a more inclusive Turkey, capable of dialoguing both with the Islamic world and with former Ottoman regions. Özal’s attention to the Middle East was based on the belief that Islam could serve as a bridge between peoples and heal the rifts between Turks and Arabs that emerged in the final phase of the Ottoman Empire.
For Özal, neo-Ottomanism was not a rejection of Kemalism, but rather a reinterpretation of it: he did not intend to question the secularism of the state, but to complement it by recognizing the cultural and religious heritage of the Empire as a resource for social pluralism. His leadership represented a break with the Republican elite: he gave space to provincial, religious, and conservative sensitivities that had previously been excluded from the top echelons of power. He publicly expressed his faith and paved the way for the emergence of a new Anatolian middle class, tied to traditional and religious values. It was from this social base that Erdoğan would later draw much of his political support. On the international stage, Özal resolutely relaunched Turkey’s EU accession process, aiming to strengthen democratic institutions, expand individual freedoms, and access new markets for the Turkish economy. This orientation accelerated significant reforms, such as the abolition of the death penalty and the recognition of rights for the Kurdish minority. In the Balkans and other post-Ottoman regions, neo-Ottomanism began to be seen as an active foreign policy strategy, also aimed at extending Turkey’s economic influence. However, the main goal was to build a shared identity around the Ottoman memory, overcoming internal ethnic divisions.
Neo-Ottomanism Between Symbolism and Pragmatism: Modern Turkey
Didem Özdemir Albayrak and Kürşad Turan, in their article “Neo-Ottomanism in Turkish Foreign Policy Through the Lenses of the Principal-Agent Theory”, provide a thorough analysis of neo-Ottomanism, identifying its first traces back in the 1950s, in connection with the role projected by the United States in the Middle East, according to the Principal-Agent theory. Beyond the more extreme expressions of Turkish politics, a certain irredentist sentiment has never completely disappeared, and the idea of increasing Turkey’s influence in the territories of the former Ottoman Empire has been perceived over time, not only as a strategic advantage but also as a necessity to maintain the support of great powers, seen as essential for Turkish national security. According to the authors, this is why neo-Ottomanism has taken (and continues to take, particularly under Erdoğan) a markedly offensive nature. However, to understand how and why these aspirations were effectively valorized under the AKP, a premise is necessary: in all the major regional crises, particularly since the 1950s, Turkey’s position fluctuated between supporting Western allies and attempting to maintain a certain regional autonomy.
Yet, in the end, alignment with the West always prevailed, making it difficult to build solid relations with the Middle East. The governments of the Democratic Party led by Adnan Menderes were ready to strengthen cooperation under the umbrella of NATO and with the support of the United States. Menderes believed that Turkey’s political-economic security and development depended on alignment with American interests. It was in this context that Turkey began to act as an agent on behalf of the United States, leveraging the “borrowed” influence from Washington in a geopolitically favorable moment. It was from this period that neo-Ottoman language began to be used not only for national purposes but also to indirectly serve American interests in the region. Through the lens of Principal-Agent Theory, where the stronger actor (the principal) tries to guide the agent toward its goals, with mutual benefits as long as objectives remain compatible, Turkey became a clear example of this dynamic. An emblematic case was the decision to allow the use of Turkish airbases by the United States during the Gulf War. Without hesitation, Turgut Özal sided with the United States, trusting in economic returns derived from such a strengthened alliance.
According to the authors, today the success of the AKP in the Middle East is largely tied to the party’s ability to leverage the Ottoman heritage to reinforce cultural, religious, economic, and political ties with countries in the region. The AKP promoted a form of soft power, combining diplomacy, trade, and cultural tools, to expand Turkey’s influence. Moreover, the party integrated identity elements, particularly religious ones, into public discourse, which strengthened support among conservative and religious groups, while generating concerns among secular elites and the military establishment. In a global context where Western support is increasingly reduced, the AKP has sought to strengthen Turkey’s role both regionally and internationally through new alliances with Muslim countries and a more pronounced projection of its economic and political influence. This approach has included privileged relationships with countries such as Qatar, Iran, and Russia (despite recent efforts to weaken their influence in Central Asia and the South Caucasus), along with active involvement in conflicts in Syria and Libya.
Within the framework of transnational Islamic solidarity, the AKP seeks to build a network of alliances around Turkey, claiming a leadership role in the Muslim world and proposing an alternative vision of Islamic civilization. In this context, the vision of Ahmet Davutoğlu, expressed in the “Strategic Depth Doctrine” (Stratejik Derinlik), is inextricably linked, albeit unintentionally, to the label of “neo-Ottomanism”. Davutoğlu argued that Turkey should assert itself as a global power, leveraging its strategic geographic position and the historical prestige derived from its Ottoman past. His foreign policy focused on strengthening Turkish influence in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East, exploiting religious affinities and shared historical ties. However, according to Marwan Kabalan, director of political analysis at the Arab Centre for Research and Policy Studies, the idea of neo-Ottomanism, understood solely as an attempt to restore the Ottoman Empire, is misleading.
Ankara’s foreign policy choices, in fact, respond to pragmatic logic driven by regional and global dynamics, rather than to an ideological plan to reconstruct a lost imperial order. In recent years, Turkey’s foreign policy has expanded its scope, particularly after the Arab uprisings of 2010-2011 and the failed coup attempt of 2016. Its actions now extend from the Western Balkans and the Caucasus to the Gulf and the Horn of Africa. This multiregional approach has led some analysts to interpret these moves as signs of “neo-Ottoman” hegemonic ambitions.
However, beyond the rhetoric and historical references, Turkey’s conduct is, in reality, more cautious and defensive than it is often perceived. The main directions of Turkish foreign policy are oriented toward pursuing three fundamental objectives: ensuring internal stability, protecting territorial integrity, and adapting to changes in the global order. For example, the conflict with the PKK and the intensifying internal threats have pushed Ankara to focus more on safeguarding national stability, while adapting its regional strategy. In 2017, the constitutional reform that granted broad powers to President Erdoğan marked the beginning of a more assertive foreign policy.
The Olive Branch Operation in Syria (2018) and the intervention in Iraq in 2022 (Claw-Lock Operation) against the PKK were manifestations of this defensive, preemptive strategy aimed at ensuring border security and containing internal threats.
In Syria, the Turkish intervention represented a significant turning point. Initially focused on toppling the Assad regime, Turkey reduced its ambitions, focusing on preventing the formation of a Kurdish enclave along its southern border. With the opposition’s offensive in 2024 and Assad’s flight, Ankara strengthened its position, becoming a key player in the Syrian conflict. By undermining Iran and Russia’s influence, Turkey gained control over a strategic territorial corridor connecting Europe to the Gulf. Another key factor in Turkish foreign policy is energy security. With about 80% of its energy supplies coming from Russia and Iran, Ankara has sought to reduce dependence on these countries by investing in resource exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean. This has also impacted its policy towards Libya, where rivalry with other regional powers has pushed Turkey to redefine its position to protect its energy interests.
Turkey’s goal is not to restore the borders of the Ottoman Empire, but to expand its trade outlets, especially in a context where the European Union is increasingly less receptive in these areas. Therefore, it is reductive to continue perceiving Turkey as a threat to Europe simply because it exerts influence in regions once controlled by former European colonial powers.
Turkey is a geopolitical actor with its own ambitions and has gained the role of a flexible regional power, using political, economic, and cultural tools to strengthen its position internationally.
The neo-Ottoman rhetoric in the Turkish internal debate emerges whenever the government uses it as leverage, both to consolidate internal consensus and to gain maneuvering room on the international stage, fully aware of its effect on the collective subconscious of the Turkish people. Today, talking about a return of the Ottoman Empire or Erdoğan’s “grand dreams” is grotesque and misleading, as it ignores the deeper context in which these narratives develop, distorting their meaning. The real issue does not lie in the personal ambitions of the so-called sultan, nor in his authoritarianism, which, although disturbing, reflects a pragmatic approach rooted in the psychology of the Turkish people, who historically tend to accept the limitation of some freedoms in exchange for social stability and internal security.
The Ottoman Empire represents a powerful and functional narrative, useful for strengthening internal consensus and intimidating external adversaries, but it is unlikely to be realized in a practical sense. In this context, the call to the Empire assumes a symbolic and communicative meaning rather than a strategic one: it is a useful rhetorical tool, but not the core of Turkey’s project. The real goal, on the contrary, is to deeply transform national identity, create a new generation of technologically educated Turks rooted in conservative values, reshape the system of alliances, and impose Turkey as a prominent power, following the vision of Hasan Celal Güzel: to achieve semi-superpower status by 2053, the 600th anniversary of the fall of Constantinople, and to establish itself as a global power by 2071, the thousandth anniversary of the Battle of Manzikert.
More article needed?
At EUReflect, we are committed to fostering an open and inclusive platform where everyone is welcome to share their perspectives. The views and opinions expressed in the articles, essays, or comments published on this platform are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official stance of EUReflect or its editorial team.
We believe in the value of dialogue and diversity of thought, and we encourage respectful and constructive contributions from all members of our community.
Thank you for being part of the conversation.
— The Editor-in-Chief
Bibliography?
Neo-Ottomanism in Turkish Foreign Policy Through the Lenses of the Principal-Agent Theory
Didem Özdemir Albayrak – Kürşad Turan
Turkey’s foreign policy and the myth of neo-Ottomanism
Marwan Kabalan
Social and Intellectual origins of Neo-Ottomanism: searching for a post national vision
M.Hakan Yavuz
Türk Siyasetinde “Neo-Osmanlıcılık”
Bahadir Gönül
The AKP’s Foreign Policy: The Misnomer of “Neo-Ottomanism”
Soner Çağaptay
Küresel Dönüşüm Sürecinde Türkiye’nin Büyük Stratejisi
Kerem Türk
