EU Report: Türkiye Aligns Just 4% with Russia Sanctions

1. Introduction

By 2025, relations between Türkiye and the European Union had entered a period of pragmatic cooperation despite persistent strategic divergences. According to the European Commission’s 2025 report, Türkiye aligned with only 4% of the EU’s restrictive measures and declarations concerning Russia—a decline from 6% in 2024. This low alignment rate illustrates a fundamental transformation in Ankara’s foreign policy rationale: Türkiye has ceased to act as an actor oriented toward European integration in the short and medium term and has instead positioned itself as a regional power pursuing strategic autonomy within an evolving international system.

The report characterises Türkiye as both a partner and a challenge: an indispensable NATO ally for European security, yet an increasingly independent and unpredictable actor with respect to the EU’s Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policy (CFSP/CSDP).

2. The Context of the 4% Alignment

The EU’s alignment mechanism serves as a key indicator of how closely candidate countries coordinate their foreign policies with Brussels. For Türkiye—whose accession process has been de facto suspended since 2018—this figure represents more than a technical statistic; it reflects a broader transformation in strategic orientation and identity.

Türkiye’s 4% alignment in 2025 was confined mainly to technical and humanitarian fields, as Ankara refrained from adopting the EU’s economic sanctions against Russia following its invasion of Ukraine. Türkiye justified its stance by arguing that sanctions not adopted within the United Nations framework lack universal legitimacy.

Nevertheless, Türkiye issued guidance to its financial institutions on the risks of non-compliance with G7 sanctions and initiated technical cooperation with EU authorities to prevent the re-export of sensitive goods through its free zones. This approach clearly demonstrates Türkiye’s attempt to strike a balance between Western expectations and its own national interests.

3. Regional Power Strategy and Economic Pragmatism

Türkiye’s limited alignment is largely the result of its economic and geopolitical interests. Russia continues to be a key partner in Türkiye’s energy supply and trade. Throughout 2025, Türkiye maintained imports of Russian energy resources and preserved air and financial connections with Moscow, despite EU calls for third countries to reduce energy dependence on Russia.

This dynamic reflects what can be termed a “regional power strategy”: Ankara pursues a multifaceted diplomacy that neither fully aligns with the West nor relies exclusively on Russia, maintaining functional engagement with both sides. While this policy sustains Türkiye’s regional influence, it simultaneously constrains full alignment with Western sanctions policies.

Economically, such pragmatism protects Türkiye’s domestic market from the adverse impacts of sanctions. The country’s economic ties with Russia—particularly in energy, grain, and tourism—remain major sources of stability. Yet, this pragmatic stance also entails reputational risks, as Brussels and Washington increasingly perceive Türkiye as a potential “backdoor” for sanction circumvention.

4. Technical Cooperation and Sanctions Circumvention

Although Türkiye has not formally adopted EU sanctions, it has engaged in technical cooperation to limit circumvention. In April 2025, Ankara agreed to halt the re-export of EU-origin critical goods to Russia and reduced exports of items on the Common High Priority List (CHPL) to pre-war levels. Additionally, Türkiye developed control mechanisms to prevent “false transit” cases—instances where goods declared as exports to Central Asia were in fact redirected to Russia.

The European Commission welcomed these efforts but called for stronger coordination with third countries and more active information-sharing with EU investigative authorities. The Commission also commended Türkiye’s verification of vessel insurance documents in the Bosphorus, aimed at mitigating environmental risks posed by Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet.”

Despite these measures, as of September 2025, twenty-three Türkiye-based companies remained listed under EU sanctions due to Russia-related activities, indicating that certain commercial leakages persist through intermediary networks.

5. Political Implications and Emerging Dynamics in Türkiye–EU Relations

Politically, Türkiye’s low alignment undermines its credibility as a candidate country and complicates cooperation within the CFSP framework. Despite the resumption of diplomatic contacts in 2025—including meetings at the level of Political Directors and CSDP consultations—the gap between operational convergence and normative divergence has widened further.

Ankara’s rejection of non-UN sanctions, coupled with its unilateral trade embargo on Israel, highlights its insistence on maintaining an autonomous decision-making capacity in foreign policy. Consequently, Türkiye no longer operates as a candidate state seeking reintegration into the EU’s normative framework but rather as a balancing power navigating between competing geopolitical poles.

This dual posture has also reshaped the EU’s perception of Türkiye: Ankara is now viewed less as a prospective member state and more as a functional yet unpredictable strategic partner.

6. The Cost of Non-Alignment for Both Sides

While Türkiye’s selective alignment provides short-term flexibility, it also entails long-term structural costs for both Türkiye and the EU. For the EU, such limited alignment weakens the coherence of European foreign policy; for Türkiye, it restricts access to classified information, reduces its capacity to participate in defence cooperation mechanisms, and limits potential integration into EU security structures.

Moreover, Türkiye’s continued dependence on Russian energy leaves it economically vulnerable in the face of potential future geopolitical shocks. Although the 2025 report notes a decline in Türkiye’s exports of high-priority goods to Russia, the structural asymmetry in energy imports persists. Hence, Ankara’s balancing strategy manifests both diplomatic diversification and economic dependence—two dimensions that simultaneously empower and constrain its foreign policy manoeuvrability.

7. Conclusion

The European Commission’s 2025 evaluation, which recorded a 4% alignment rate, clearly reflects Türkiye’s preference for strategic autonomy in foreign policy. Rather than pursuing normative alignment with the EU, Ankara follows a strategy centred on flexibility, mediation, and the expansion of regional influence.

This marks the emergence of a “post-alignment era” in Türkiye’s external relations—one defined not by rejection of the West, nor by full adherence to it, but by a pragmatic approach that navigates the grey zones of a multipolar system. For the EU, this creates a paradoxical balance: Türkiye remains too important to alienate, yet too independent to fully integrate.

Unless a renewed framework for mutual trust and normative dialogue is established, Türkiye will continue to function as a balancing power on the periphery of Europe’s strategic architecture—indispensable for European security, yet politically distant from its normative core.