Post-Conflict Political Objectives of Pakistan and India Following the May Clashes
The four-day armed conflict between Pakistan and India in May 2025 generated significant repercussions in both regional and global dynamics.

The four-day armed conflict between Pakistan and India in May 2025 generated significant repercussions in both regional and global dynamics. When evaluated in terms of geographic scope and the complexity of engagements, the clashes have been described as the most intense military confrontation between the two countries since the 1971 War and the 1999 Kargil Crisis.
The conflict began on 7 May 2025 with aerial strikes launched by the Indian Air Force on mainland Pakistan. As a result, India confirmed the loss of four Rafale fighter jets. This operational failure not only weakened India’s strategic posture but also caused a noticeable decline in its international image. Conversely, the Pakistan Air Force emerged from the hostilities with a heightened sense of confidence, having effectively employed Chinese-manufactured missile and radar systems. [1]
The conflict was portrayed domestically in both countries as rooted in the Hindu-Muslim identity divide, a narrative that served to consolidate internal political support for the governments in Islamabad and New Delhi. At the time of the escalation, the Pakistani government was grappling with two major domestic crises. The first was the hijacking of a Karachi-Peshawar train by the Baloch Liberation Organization, which advocates for Baloch independence and held 300 passengers hostage. The second issue was the imprisonment of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) leader Imran Khan, whose political influence had grown significantly in the Pashtun regions. The perceived external threat from India helped defuse both crises to some extent—at least temporarily—by diverting national attention and pushing the PTI to postpone its mass mobilization until August. The public rallied under the national flag, organizing demonstrations in support of the military. However, these domestic challenges did not disappear entirely; they merely receded from the political agenda in the aftermath of the conflict.
In India, the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) intensified pressure on the Muslim population while simultaneously seeking to counter pro-Pakistani sentiments among Indian Muslims. The government emphasized national unity by framing the casualties of the Pahalgam attack as including both a Christian and a Muslim, suggesting that peace and security are attainable for all under the Indian flag. Nonetheless, the government was compelled to temporarily scale back its aggressive posture toward China and Pakistan. The loss of four high-tech, French-made fighter jets within four days raised not only concerns about India’s military capabilities but also broader questions regarding the comparative effectiveness of Western versus Chinese military technologies. Subsequently, India took a notable diplomatic step: after a six-year hiatus, New Delhi dispatched a high-level delegation to Beijing for official talks. [2] This move may be interpreted as an indication of India’s desire to adopt a more multidimensional foreign policy in the post-conflict environment and to refocus on global trade and regional cooperation.
[1] Pakistan’s use of J-10C jets and missiles exposes potency of Chinese weaponry https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/may/14/pakistans-use-of-j-10c-jets-and-missiles-exposes-potency-of-chinese-arms
[2] First meeting since Galwan clash: EAM Jaishankar meets Chinese President Xi Jinping; updates him on recent development in bilateral ties https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/sco-meet-jaishankar-meets-chinese-president-xi-jinping-in-beijing-calls-for-far-seeing-approach-in-india-china-ties/articleshow/122482260.cms
Selman Altuntas
Contributing writer at EUReflect.