Will Lebanon Remain United, or Will Civil War Accompany Rising Regional Tensions?

Introduction

As Lebanon faces a second major regional war in two years and is one of the main actors in the current conflict, the Lebanese people are finding it somewhat difficult to collaborate with those affected by the Israeli attacks that have led to over 800,000 people being displaced from their homes. Lebanon’s 10,452 square kilometers of territory may be on the brink of significant change. How will the Lebanese people respond to these difficult times, and could it possibly escalate out of control, leading to an internal conflict in the country?

How were the Lebanese led into the current conflict

After the 1979 Iranian revolution, Iran positioned itself not only as a revolution against the former state, but also against the West as a whole. Shortly after the reign of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei commenced, the Islamist regime found its opportunity in Lebanon, funding the Shia communities in southern Lebanon to protect the southern Lebanese borders during the attempted Israeli ground invasion in 1982, which led to the formation of an Iranian-backed militia (Hezbollah), which presented itself as part of the ‘resistance’. This Shia Islamist movement is supported and funded by Iran’s Islamic regime, and it presents itself as part of a broader “resistance” against Israeli occupation and Western influence in the region. During the war in Gaza, then secretary‑general of the Iran-backed militia, Hassan Nasrallah, publicly aligned them with the Palestinian cause and pledged that the group would not remain passive in the face of what the United Nations described as ongoing genocide in the Gaza Strip. The former leader of the group was killed on 27 September 2024 in an Israeli air strike that reportedly involved the use of around 100 one‑ton bombs targeting a meeting of senior Iran-backed leaders in a bunker 18 meters underground in Haret Hreik, marking a major shift in the group’s leadership.

Naim Qassem was one of the figures involved in the founding of Hezbollah in 1982, during the Lebanese civil war and the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon. Qassem was elected by Hezbollah’s Shura Council as Nasrallah’s permanent successor after the killing of the presumed successor, Hashem Safiedine, in early October 2024. He received the endorsement of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as the former secretary general’s heir and was later appointed as Khamenei’s representative in Lebanon in February 2025, further formalising his role within the Iran‑Hezbollah axis. These developments consolidated the militia’s leader’s position at the centre of Hezbollah’s political and military decision‑making at a time of heightened regional tension.

After not responding to the Israeli hostilities and 10,000+ violations of the agreed ceasefire, the militia has taken it upon themselves to respond to the killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei with over 60 missiles and drones towards Northern Israel, officially cementing Lebanese soil as another battleground in the current war in the Middle East.

The Lebanese government’s attitude

Lebanese citizens, both inside the country and in the diaspora, hold diverse views on Hezbollah’s political role and military activities. Some continue to see the group as fulfilling its original stated purpose of defending southern Lebanon from Israeli attacks and occupation. Others increasingly criticise them, arguing that their involvement in regional conflicts and their close alignment with Iran expose Lebanon to significant security risks and undermine state sovereignty.

The current Lebanese leadership has expressed concern about the Iranian-backed militia’s unilateral military actions. Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, a former judge and president of the International Court of Justice(ICJ), has publicly characterised the group’s military operations as a threat to national security. President Joseph Aoun, a former army commander, has shared similar concerns, though he has generally adopted a more cautious and diplomatic tone than the prime minister. Despite differences in style, both leaders have articulated a common objective: to limit or end Hezbollah’s autonomous military role and to reinforce Lebanon’s diplomatic relations with the United States. Following Hezbollah’s response to the killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and its subsequent escalation against Israel, the Lebanese government moved to formally contest the group’s military activities. In March 2026, Hezbollah’s military operations were declared illegal and banned by the authorities, signaling an attempt by the state to reassert control over the use of force on Lebanese territory. The practical implementation of this decision, however, remains complex given the militia’s entrenched political influence and military capabilities.

The Lebanese government has also publicly shown plans to detach from relations with Iran, following the declaration by the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the acting Iranian ambassador to Lebanon, Mohammed Reza Raouf Sheibani, is persona non grata as of March 24th 2026. The Iranian ambassador refused the five-day leave period, a decision backed by Hezbollah, the Iranian Foreign Ministry, and Lebanese parliament speaker Nabih Berri.

The Lebanese people and their political positioning

The Lebanese society is characterised by significant religious and sectarian diversity, with multiple communities and branches of major religions coexisting within a relatively small territory. The Lebanese civil war, which lasted from 1975 to 1990, was deeply rooted in political, sectarian, and social cleavages and has left a lasting impact on the country’s political system and collective memory. Since 2019, Lebanon has experienced a severe economic and financial crisis, including currency collapse, high inflation, and rising poverty, which has fueled widespread public anger at the political elite. The crisis contributed to the nationwide protest movement often referred to as the Lebanese Revolution, which initially brought together large numbers of citizens across sectarian lines. This period was followed by the global COVID‑19 pandemic and the devastating ammonium nitrate explosion at the Beirut port, events that further strained state institutions and deepened social and political tensions. The port explosion sharpened debates over responsibility and governance. Some Lebanese blame Hezbollah, alleging that the group was responsible for the storage of 2,750 tonnes of ammonium nitrate at the port. In contrast, others focus their criticism on broader state negligence and systemic corruption.

Many observers also trace a turning point in Lebanon’s internal polarisation to the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, for which Hezbollah operative Salim Ayyash was later convicted in absentia by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon. Hezbollah denies any involvement in this devastating attack.

In the current context, Lebanese public opinion on Hezbollah and the regional conflict is highly polarised. One camp calls for the immediate halt of Hezbollah’s military activities and emphasises the primacy of state institutions and national security. Another camp strongly defends Hezbollah, condemns critics as aligning with Western or Israeli interests, and views the group as central to resisting external aggression. Although comprehensive, up‑to‑date statistics are limited, some estimates suggest that roughly 30% of the Lebanese population continues to support the now-illegal militia, reflecting the group’s enduring base despite growing domestic and international pressure. While over 800,000 reported displaced citizens from the south which involve the majority of supporters of the group, the Lebanese people have grown a sense of fear about the overcrowding of the Lebanese territory towards Beirut and the North, all while coming with a mix of political opinions which have caused minor conflicts up until this moment, may blow out of proportion if not tackled properly. Naim Qassem has addressed the Lebanese government several times during the "14-month war" in 2023-2024, stating that moving forward with imposing a state monopoly on arms will result in an "internal explosion" and that the government will bear responsibility. Now that the Lebanese government has deemed Hezbollah's military actions as illegal, will this "internal explosion" follow the ongoing war?

Conclusion

Under its current leadership, the Iran-backed group has become a central actor in the current regional escalation, tying developments in Lebanon more closely to wider tensions involving Iran, Israel, and the United States. The Lebanese government has formally opposed the militia’s unilateral military actions and sought to reassert state authority, while large segments of the population remain deeply divided over the group’s role and legitimacy. These overlapping dynamics, regional confrontation, economic collapse, institutional fragility, and entrenched sectarian and political divides have raised concerns that Lebanon could face renewed internal conflict. As of 3 April, the Israeli army is reportedly attempting to invade and occupy southern Lebanon up to the Litani River, claiming it is an act to protect themselves from Hezbollah, adding further pressure to an already volatile situation. Whether Qassem’s tenure will ultimately act as a catalyst for a new civil war will depend on how Hezbollah, the Lebanese state, and external actors navigate the next phase of this crisis, and on whether domestic and international efforts succeed in containing it.